CURTIS: CHINA’S PUSH FOR GLOBAL MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPREMACY IS A MAJOR THREAT

A transcript of the exchange between Senators Curtis and Rubio can be found below and video can be found here.

Senator Curtis: Senator Rubio, for the last seven years, from a distance of about 600 feet, that’s what separates the House chamber and the Senate chamber, I’ve watched and admired your work from a distance, and on a few, but very fortunate times I’ve had the chance to actually be wind at your back on some of your work supporting Taiwan and protecting Hong Kong dissidents as we worked together on some legislation.

Now, in a twist of events, I sit not far from where you once sat. And there’s another symbolic 600 feet between us, between the State Department and the Senate. And I’m excited to work with you in your new role. And I would like to continue to be wind at your back on a lot of issues, and none more important to me than China. And if you remember really nothing else about our short interchange today, please know that that’s very important to me, and I hope to work with you on what I call the aggression of China. And in many ways, their global push for military and economic supremacy, I think, is a threat in many ways.

China is imposing, it’s what they call “China One” principle on the world, which is very different than, you know, from our China policy. Can you kind of describe how we can push back on that and how we need to make sure we’re shaping that conversation?

Senator Rubio: Yeah. And, well, the first is to understand that the One China policy is and the U.S. policy towards the issue of Taiwan has been consistent and reaffirmed by every administration since 1979. And it is the combination of the Taiwan Relations Act, where the six assurances make clear the United States, we’re not going to pressure Taiwan in any arrangement. We’re not going to tell you when we’re going to stop, if ever. We make no commitment to not helping them in their national defense. We’re not going to force any outcomes.

And frankly, we are going to do everything, and we reject any effort to coerce, intimidate and or forcibly drive Taiwan to do whatever China wants them to do. And that’s been our position, and that will continue. That was the position under President Trump’s first Administration. I anticipate it will continue to be in the second administration. I think within that context, it’s important for us to find every opportunity possible to allow Taiwan to engage in international forums, where important issues are discussed and they’re not represented, irrespective of what China claims about One China principle, they’re not represented.

And so, the views there need to be, they need to have an opportunity in these forums to be made clear. But I think stability is critically important. Here’s the one thing I would point to here with regards to stability. If the Chinese are in fact serious about stabilizing U.S.-China relations and finding avenues of which we can be cooperative and avoid conflict, then they will not do anything rash or irrational when it comes to Taiwan or the Philippines for that matter. The actions they are taking now are deeply destabilizing. They are forcing us to take counter actions because we have commitments to the Philippines, and we have commitments to Taiwan that we intend to keep.

And so if they want to destabilize the relationship or they want to help at least create some pathway for stabilization of our relationship with them, even as we remain engaged in global competition and in some cases, more adversarial than others, they really need to stop messing around with Taiwan and with the Philippines because it’s forcing us to focus our attention in ways we prefer not to have to.

Curtis: As a matter of interest, I actually lived in Taiwan in August of 1979, three months after that Act that you referred to. And, I think you’re very accurate. I think for a minute about Europe and there’s some countries it feels like in Europe, because of their presence, Poland, Czech Republic and Baltics, that are more in tune with this issue.

But as a whole, it feels like some European nations are in denial of some of the things you’ve just said. You talk a little bit about how we work with our NATO friends over there, and how we get them to appreciate this, and actually play a part in this.

Rubio: Well, I think in the case of NATO, I think I would expand it to really talk about the European Union and the EU, which I think is increasingly every single day coming to the realization of the threat that China’s mercantilist policies and unfair trade policies are posing to them. They are flooding the European market with their cheaper electric cars, or attempting to do so.

There’s a dispute now about the importation of aluminum on sector after sector. You’re seeing the EU confronting the reality. By the same token, you know, they’re like many countries around the world, including ours to some extent, there’s a quandary involved. There is an inter-meshing economic relations that you can’t just walk away from, but you also recognized the long term threat that Chinese practices are having on your economic lives.

And so, I think that’s an area in which the Europeans, some more than others, are increasingly aware and willing to be more forceful. Italy has been willing to lean into it more than perhaps some other countries in the region. Hopefully that will continue to change.

On the security front, look, an event in the Indo-Pacific, say let’s leave Taiwan out of it for a moment and say it’s the Philippines. In the last 48 hours, there’s this massive, I don’t even know how to describe it, but this massive ship that the Chinese have built that’s like headed towards the Philippines. And the Philippines feels threatened by it. Rightfully so. We’ve seen this on a daily basis, the harassment and so forth, but on a daily basis. If God forbid there is some miscommunication or some inadvertent conflict emerges there and we have obligations to them, the impact that will have on the entire globe, the impact that it will have on the entire globe is enormous.

And that includes Europe. So, they have a selfish vested interest in seeking for the Chinese to curb their behaviors. I would also point to the Europeans that what the Russians have done with Ukraine would not have been possible without the assistance of China. Whether it’s the sharing of technology or aid in evading sanctions or selling their oil in secondary markets, the Chinese have been hidden, but clear to everyone watching, partners in the Russian endeavor. And the Europeans know this, and they need to be continually reminded of it because it reveals the nature of who we’re dealing with. 

Curtis: That was actually my next question, so I’m going to skip that one. But thank you for addressing that. I want to turn to Hong Kong. I mentioned I lived over in that area, and I actually remember as a young man in the 1980s, shopping for a camera in Hong Kong. As a businessman in the 2000s, I tried to sell my product over there in Hong Kong. I’ve been over there a number of times as a tourist and just enjoyed that beautiful city.

And unfortunately, today, none of that is possible. Matter of fact, I actually have a warrant for my arrest over there because of the work in the House that I’ve done over there. Can you talk a little bit about the role there? And what’s even worse is Hong Kong is now playing a role in facilitating sanctions evasion and money laundering. And can you address that issue? 

Rubio: Well, I think it’s important to take 30 seconds down memory lane. Hong Kong was turned over by the UK with a strong set of assurances that it would remain autonomous and independent. It would be governed by the Chinese, but independent, they would have a democracy, there would be free enterprise, they would be left alone.

In essence, that’s the promises they made. Over time, they have violated every promise. They basically broke the deal, just like they lied about all the island chains that they said they weren’t going to populate and militarize, and they have done so as well. And so today, we cannot consider Hong Kong to truly be autonomous anymore.

It is not it is now under the full control, especially on national security matters, of Chinese authorities. And it should not be surprising to us that these deeply rooted banking institutions that are in Hong Kong, who’ve long served as financial capital on a global scale, are now being used to the benefit of the Communist Party and to evade global sanctions.

And I think there has to be a growing recognition of that. I also think it’s important to remind those sectors in finance that are still involved there, that the Chinese national security law, that’s now been implemented in Hong Kong, allows them if they don’t like what you’re doing to basically trump up any charges they want, go into your offices, raid the boxes, see all of your files, threaten to jail you, and they’ve done so in some cases.

So, it’s no longer a hospitable place for people to conduct financial activity. So, I think we have to call it for what it is, the notion that Hong Kong is now some autonomous entity that operates within China’s system, but independent of it, and the decisions they make is a complete work of fiction.

Curtis: Yeah. I want one more quick question, but I also want to point out, before we go on, how good it could have been for Hong Kong and China had they kept that agreement. I think they’d have been a whole lot better for China. Last question as we run out of time, obviously, there’s a lot of conversation about Panama in the news. Can you talk about the Chinese influence in the Panama Canal and what Americans should know?

Rubio: Well, let me tell you, I actually didn’t print a lot. I mean, I brought things to read like verbatim here, but there’s one that I thought was interesting that I wanted to share, and I’m not going to put it out there for everybody but the whole thing.

But maybe I’ll submit it for the record. But I just went through this thing with Panama and the Canal is not new. I visited there, it was 2016. I think I’ve consistently seen people expressed concern about it, and it’s encapsulated here in quote after quote. Let me tell you, the former U.S. ambassador who served under President Obama said, “The Chinese see in Panama what we saw in Panama throughout the 20th century, a maritime and aviation logistics hub.” The immediate past head of the U.S. Southern Command, General Laura Richardson, said, “I was just in Panama about a month ago and flying along the Panama Canal and looking at the state owned enterprises from the People’s Republic of China on each side of the Panama Canal, they looked like civilian companies or state owned enterprises that could be used for dual use and could be quickly changed over to a military capability.” We see questions that were asked by the Ranking Member in the House China Select Committee, where he asked a witness, and they agreed, that in a time of conflict, China could use its presence on both ends of the Canal as a choke point against the United States in a conflict situation.

So, the concerns about Panama have been expressed by people on both sides of the aisle for at least the entire time that I’ve been in the United States Senate, and they’ve only accelerated further. And this is a very legitimate issue that we face there. And I think there’s, I’m not prepared to answer this question because I haven’t looked at the legal research behind it yet, but I’m compelled to suspect that an argument could be made that the terms under which that Canal were turned over have been violated, because while technically sovereignty over the Canal has not been turned over to a foreign power, in reality, a foreign power today possesses through their companies, which we know are not independent, the ability to turn the canal into a choke point in a moment of conflict. And that is a direct threat to the national interest and security of the United States, and is particularly galling given the fact that we paid for it and that 5,000 Americans died making it. That said, Panama is a great partner in a lot of other issues, and I hope we can resolve this issue of the canal and of its security, and also continue to work with them cooperatively on a host of issues we share in common, including what to do with migration.

Curtis: Thank you, Senator. I’m out of time. Thank you so much.