Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senator John Curtis (R-UT)—Chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues—today held a hearing on the People’s Republic of China’s influence and Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in the Western Hemisphere. The panel witnesses included Dr. Evan Ellis, Senior Associate, America’s Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Samantha Custer, Director of Policy Analysis, AidData Global Research Institute at the College of William and Mary.

In his opening remarks, Chairman Curtis marked the five-year anniversary of his bipartisan TAIPEI Act, a law he sponsored to strengthen U.S. support for Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and push back against China’s coercive influence. The Senator argued that China’s efforts threaten not only Taiwan’s global position but also U.S. national interests and regional stability. He also announced the upcoming Taiwan Allies Fund Act, a bipartisan bill that would allocate resources from the Countering PRC Malign Influence Fund to support nations maintaining ties with Taiwan.

During his questioning of the witnesses, Curtis explored China’s evolving influence in Latin America, focusing especially on recent developments in Panama and the broader strategic implications for Taiwan and U.S. interests.

A transcript of the Chairman’s opening remarks can be found below and the video file can be downloaded here.

Opening Remarks:

Today marks five years since my bill, the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act was signed into law. This bipartisan Act that I sponsored in the House, which passed unanimously through Congress, has been pivotal in protecting Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies from Beijing’s coercion.

The TAIPEI Act strengthens Taiwan’s position in the world by promoting deeper trade with Taiwan, supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, and, most importantly, protecting Taiwan’s relations with its allies. In short, it sent a loud message of U.S. support for Taiwan, making clear that we stand with our democratic partners and will not tolerate attempts to isolate Taiwan. 

I am proud of the TAIPEI Act’s legacy and hope this subcommittee hearing serves as a reaffirmation on this five-year anniversary. The TAIPEI Act came as a response to Beijing’s intensified campaign of coercion in the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific aimed at prying away Taiwan’s allies.

 In Latin America and the Caribbean, this pressure is unceasing. Specifically, the TAIPEI Act came as a response to Panama, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador switching diplomatic recognition. Not only did they switch diplomatic recognition, but they adopted China’s “One China Principle”—or China’s claim that Taiwan is part of China. Honduras became the latest to switch recognition in 2023, severing its 82-year alliance with Taiwan after making exorbitant demand for billions in aid that Taiwan wasn’t able to fill but that Beijing did—for a price.

Even regional institutions have not been spared: the Central American Parliament was pressured to expel Taiwan’s observer and replace it with China, underscoring the breadth of China’s influence campaign in our backyard.

Beijing’s tactics in our hemisphere are increasingly blatant and coercive. State Department officials have rightfully likened China’s approach in our region to 19th-century imperialism – bribing local leaders with investments in ways that lead to debt dependency.

Make no mistake: China’s goal is to isolate Taiwan completely with the goal of silencing international dissent if China forces unification on Taiwan, and it is deploying every tool at its disposal to achieve that end in our very own hemisphere. It is squarely in the United States’ national interest to push back against Beijing’s encroachment in our own backyard and to support those nations that continue to stand with Taiwan.

China’s influence efforts in the Western Hemisphere threaten not only Taiwan’s position in the world, but also global stability and U.S. interests. We must respond with equal resolve. That means redoubling our engagement with Taiwan’s remaining allies to ensure they have strong economic and security incentives to stick with Taiwan.

The TAIPEI Act charts the course: the U.S. should prioritize support and diplomatic engagement with countries that maintain ties with Taiwan, and consider downgrading relations with those who bow to Beijing. This aligns with the Trump Administration’s goal of ensuring our dollars spent abroad are making Americans more safe, secure, and prosperous.

This is why I will join a bipartisan group of House and Senate colleagues next week to introduce the Taiwan Allies Fund Act, which I view as a natural follow-up to the TAIPEI Act. This bill sets aside a portion of the already-appropriated Countering PRC Malign Influence Fund to focus on helping countries that stand strong in the face of PRC pressure and maintain or strengthen ties with Taiwan. 

We cannot allow the Chinese Communist Party to buy out Taiwan’s friends in our own backyard. We will continue to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Taiwan and help it shore up its allies, countering Beijing’s coercion at every turn.

Taiwan’s allies in this hemisphere have shown courage and loyalty in the face of intense pressure. The United States will not abandon them. On the contrary, we will strengthen our alliances with these partners rejecting authoritarian influence.  

Together, we send a clear message: Taiwan is not alone, and the Western Hemisphere will not become a playground for the PRC.